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Abstract
The rationalizability concept was introduced in Bernheim [1984] and
Pearce [1984] to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a
non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However,
this notion can be defined in a number of ways that differ in seemingly
unimportant minor details. We shed light on these differences, explain
their impact, and clarify for which games these definitions coincide.
Then we apply the same analysis to explain the differences and sim-
ilarities between various ways the iterated elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies was defined in the literature. This allows us to clarify
the results of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] and Chen, Long and
Luo [2005] and improve upon them. We also consider the extension of
these results to strict dominance by a mixed strategy.
Our approach is based on a general study of the operators on com-
plete lattices. We allow transfinite iterations of the considered operators
and clarify the need for them. The advantage of such a general approach
is that a number of results, including order independence for some of
the notions of rationalizability and strict dominance, come for free.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Rationalizability was introduced in Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984] to for-
malize the intuition that players in non-cooperatives games act by having
common knowledge of each others’ rational behaviour. Rationalizable strate-
gies are then defined as a limit of an iterative process in which one repeatedly
removes the strategies that are never best responses to the beliefs held about
the other players.
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To better understand the rationale for the research here reported consider
the following example.
Example 1 Bertrand competition.
Consider a version of Bertrand competition between two firms in which the
marginal costs are 0 and in which the range of possible prices is the left-open
real interval (0, 100]. So in this game H there are two players, each with the
set (0, 100] of strategies. We assume that the demand equals 100− p, where p
is the lower price and that the profits are split in case of a tie. So the payoff
functions are defined by:
p1(s1, s2) :=


s1(100− s1) if s1 < s2
s1(100− s1)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s1 > s2
p2(s1, s2) :=


s2(100− s2) if s2 < s1
s2(100− s2)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s2 > s1
This game has no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
Consider now each player’s best responses to the strategies of the opponent.
Since s1 = 50 maximizes the value of s1(100− s1) in the interval (0, 100], the
strategy 50 is the unique best response of the first player to any strategy
s2 > 50 of the second player. Further, no strategy is a best response to a
strategy s2 ≤ 50. By symmetry the same holds for the strategies of the second
player.
This eliminates for each player each strategy different than 50 and reduces
the original game to the game G := ({50}, {50}, p1, p2) in which each player
has just one strategy, 50.
There are now two natural ways to proceed. If we adopt the approach
of Pearce [1984], we should now focus on the current game G and note that
s1 = 50 is a best response in G to s2 = 50 and symmetrically for the second
player. So the iterated elimination of never best responses stops and the
outcome is G.
However, if we adopt the approach of Bernheim [1984], we should continue
to consider the best responses in the original game H . Now in H the strategy
s1 = 49 is a better response to s2 = 50 than s1 = 50 and symmetrically for the
second player. So in the second round of elimination of never best responses
both strategies 50 are eliminated and we reach the empty game.
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So depending on the procedure we adopt we obtain two different outcomes.
✷
We shall return to this example in Section 5. We shall show there that
using the first elimination procedure we can still reach the empty game, if in
each round only some strategies are removed. This might suggest that both
approaches are equivalent if we do not insist on removing all strategies in each
round (analogously to the case of iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies). However, as we shall see, this statement is false.
So we see that the iterated elimination of best responses process can be
defined in two different ways. In fact, two other definitions can be naturally
envisaged. Each of these four definitions captures the original intuition in a
meaningful way. Indeed, all four operators upon which these definitions rely
yield the same outcome when applied to the original game. The differences
arise when these operators are iterated.
Let us move now to the case of strict dominance. Consider the following
example.
Example 2 Production with a discontinuity.
Consider a game H with two players, each, as in the previous example with
the set (0, 100] of strategies. The payoff functions are defined now by:
p1(s1, s2) :=
{
f1(s1, s2) if (s1, s2) 6= (100, 100)
0 otherwise
p2(s1, s2) :=
{
f2(s1, s2) if (s1, s2) 6= (100, 100)
0 otherwise
where each function fi is strictly increasing in the ith argument. (A simple
example is fi(s1, s2) := si.)
A possible interpretation of this game is as follows. The strategy of a player
represents the amount of his resource that he chooses. If each player ’overdoes
it’ and chooses the maximum amount, the outcome is bad (0) for both of them.
Otherwise each player gets the outcome computed by his production function
fi. Also this game has no Nash equilibrium.
Consider now each player’s strategies that are not strictly dominated.
Clearly every strategy si 6= 100 is strictly dominated and 100 is not strictly
dominated. By eliminating all strictly dominated strategies the original game
reduces to the game G := ({100}, {100}, p1, p2) in which each player has just
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one strategy, 100. The payoff for each player to the joint strategy (100, 100)
is 0.
Again, there are two natural ways to proceed. If we take the usual ap-
proach, adopted in numerous publications, we should focus on the current
game, G. Since this game is solved (i.e., each player has just one strategy)
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, in short IESDS, stops
and the outcome is G.
However, if we adopt the approach of Milgrom and Roberts [1990, pages
1264-1265], we should continue and consider which strategies in the game G
are strictly dominated (against the opponent strategies in G) in the original
game H . Now, for each player i each strategy 100 is strictly dominated by any
other strategy si in the game H as each si yields a strictly higher payoff against
the strategy 100 of the opponent. So in the second round of elimination of
strictly dominated strategies both strategies 100 are eliminated and we reach
the empty game.
So also here, depending on the procedure we adopt we obtain two different
outcomes. (A perceptive reader may notice that the elimination of never best
responses also reduces the original game to ({100}, {100}, p1, p2) and that in
the original game for each player each strategy 6= 100 is a better response to
100 than 100. So also here the outcome of the iterated elimination of never
best responses depends on the adopted procedure.) ✷
In fact, we show that also IESDS can be defined in four natural ways and
that the resulting outcomes differ.
1.2 Approach and summary of results
To analyze in a uniform way various ways of iterated elimination of strategies
here considered we consider arbitary operators on complete lattices and their
transfinite iterations. This allows us to prove various results concerning the
rationalizability and IESDS by simply checking the properties of underlying
operators. For example, order independence for specific definitions turns out to
be a direct consequence of the fact that the underlying operator is monotonic.
Before we proceed let us clarify two, rather unusual aspects of our approach.
First, the use of transfinite induction and ordinals in reasoning about games is
rare though not uncommon. The following illustrative examples come to our
mind. In Binmore [2007, Chapter 7] (and implicitly in the original version,
Binmore [1991]) a proof, attributed to G. Owen, of the Minimax Theorem is
given that is based on transfinite induction. Next, in Lipman [1991] transfinite
ordinals are used in a study of limited rationality, while in Lipman [1994] a
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two-player game is constructed for which the ω (the first infinite ordinal) and
ω+1 iterations of the rationalizability operator of Bernheim [1984] differ. That
is, ω iterations are insufficient to reach a fixpoint. This motivates the author
to study transfinite iterations of this operator. We shall return to this matter
in Section 4. In turn, Heifetz and Samet [1998] show that in general arbitrary
ordinals are necessary in the epistemic analysis of strategic games based on
the partition spaces. Finally, as argued in Chen, Long and Luo [2005], the
notion of IESDS a` la Milgrom and Roberts [1990], when used for arbitrary
games, also requires transfinite iterations of the underlying operator.
The mathematical reason for the use of transfinite induction is that the
underlying operators, even if they are monotonic, are in general not continuous.
So to reach a fixpoint, by the theorem of Tarski [1955] (which generalizes and
strengthens the initial result of Knaster [1928]), one needs to consider iterations
that continue beyond ω.
Second, we consider solution concepts based on the iterated elimination of
strategies that can yield the empty outcomes. This is inherent in the nature of
infinite games as it can then easily happen that no strategy is a best response or
that each strategy is strictly dominated. The empty outcome only indicates
that in some games the players have no rational strategy to choose from.
Analogous problems arise if one adopts as a solution concept the set of Nash
equilibria of a non-cooperative game or the core of a cooperative game. In
both cases these sets can be empty. To quote from Aumann [1985]:
My main thesis is that a solution concept should be judged more by
what it does than by what it is; more by its success in establishing
relationships and providing insights into the workings of the social
processes to which it is applied than by considerations of a a priori
plausibility based on its definition alone.
Our analysis allows us to conclude that in the case of arbitrary games
among four ways of defining rationalizability only two, the one due Bern-
heim [1984] and its contracting version (a notion explained in Section 3), are
meaningful. The crucial feature of these two operators is that they refer to
the best responses in the initial game and not the currently considered game.
As a result these two operators are monotonic. However, under the assump-
tion that to each belief in the initial game a best response exists (assumption
B), the iterations of all four operators coincide even though the other two
still are not monotonic. We also explain the need for transfinite iterations of
the corresponding operators, even for the games that satisfy assumption B.
Assumption B is in particular satisfied by the compact games with contin-
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uous payoff functions, which explains why the reported differences were not
discussed in the literature.
We also apply the same analysis to the notion of strict dominance. We
explain that the operator underlying the usual definiton is not monotonic.
This clarifies why this definition of strict dominance is not order independent
for arbitrary infinite games (see Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002]).
In contrast, the version of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies used in Milgrom and Roberts [1990] and more recently in Ritzberger
[2001, Section 5.1] is monotonic. The contracting version of it studied in Chen,
Long and Luo [2005]. The authors of the latter paper show that the resulting
elimination procedure is stronger than the customary one, requires transfinite
iterations, does not remove any Nash equilibria, and is order independent. In
our framework order independence of both versions is a direct consequence of
the monotonicity of the underlying operators.
We also consider a natural conditionC(α) of the initial game, parametrized
by an ordinal α, that formalizes the statement that in each reduction reachable
from the initial game in α iterations every strictly dominated strategy has an
undominated dominator. We show that ∀αC(α) implies order independence
of the usual definition of strict dominance. Further, ∀αC(α) implies that the
iterations of all four considered operators coincide. Assumption ∀αC(α) is in
particular satisfied by the finite games.
Our formalization of the conditionC(α) differs from the one used in Dufwen-
berg and Stegeman [2002] for which the authors showed that the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies may fail to be order independent
in their sense. (Our definitions of order independence differ, since we allow
transfinite iterations of the underlying operators.) We show that C(ω) implies
order independence, in the sense used in Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002], of
strict dominance. This yields a minor improvement of their result. Finally,
we explain how to extend these results to the case of iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies by a mixed strategy.
1.3 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Standard concepts on strategic games and
examples of belief structures to which the results of this paper apply are intro-
duced in Section 2. Next, in Section 3 some general results about monotonic
and contracting operators on complete lattices are established that provide a
basis for our approach.
In Section 4 we discuss two operators that underly the definitions of ratio-
nalizability, including the one due to Bernheim [1984]. Both are monotonic,
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so the revelant properties of these operators and of their outcomes are direct
consequences of the general results established in Section 3.
Then in Section 5 we discuss two slightly different operators defining a no-
tion of rationalizability. We conclude that one of them cannot be meaningfully
used to formalize the notion of rationalizability and the other one, underly-
ing the definition of rationalizability due to Pearce [1984], leads to too weak
conclusions for a game modelling Bertrand competition for two firms. On the
other hand, in Section 6 we show that the best response property in the initial
game implies that the iterations of all four operators coincide.
Then in Sections 7 and 8 we discuss in detail four natural ways of defining
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and analyze when the it-
erations of the corresponding four operators coincide. In Section 9 we compare
our results with those of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] and clarify in what
sense we established a new order independence result.
Next, in Section 10 consider an extension of these results to the case of
strict dominance by a mixed strategy. Finally, in Section 11 we assess the
results of this paper stressing that monotonicity and transfinite iterations are
most relevant for a study of reduction operators on games.
In the literature we found only one reference concerned with a similar
comparative analysis of the notion of rationalizability. Ambroszkiewicz [1994]
studied the limited case of two-player games and beliefs being equal to the
strategies of the opponent, and showed that the finite iterations of two opera-
tors concerned with the notion of rationalizablity coincide for compact games
with continuous payoffs. We clarify his result in Section 6.
Parts of this research were reported in Apt [2005].
2 Game theoretic preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games and their restrictions
Let us move now to the subject of strategic games. Given n players (n > 1)
we represent a strategic game (in short, a game) by a sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn),
where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• Si is the non-empty set of strategies available to player i,
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1 × . . . × Sn→R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
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Given a sequence of sets of strategies S1, . . ., Sn and s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn we
denote the ith element of s by si and use the following standard notation:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly with some superscripts.
We say that G := (S1, . . ., Sn) is a restriction of a game H := (T1, . . ., Tn,
p1, . . ., pn) if each Si is a (possibly empty) subset of Ti. We identify the re-
striction (T1, . . ., Tn) with H . The restrictions are naturally ordered by the
componentwise set inclusion:
(S1, . . ., Sn)⊆ (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n) iff Si ⊆ S
′
i for all i ∈ [1..n].
If some Si is empty, (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn (we identify here each pi with its
restriction to the smaller domain) is not a game and the references to pj(s)
(for any j ∈ [1..n]) are incorrect, so we shall need to be careful about this. If
all Si are empty, we call G an empty restriction .
2.2 Belief structures
Throughout the paper H := (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) is a fixed game.
Our intention is to explain various concepts of rationalizability abstracting
from specific sets of beliefs that are assumed. Therefore we only assume that
each player i in the game H has some further unspecified non-empty set of
beliefs Bi about his opponents and that each payoff function pi can be modified
to an expected payoff function pi : Si × Bi→R.
In what follows we also assume that each set of beliefs Bi of player i in H
can be narrowed to any restriction G of H . We denote the outcome of this
narrowing of Bi to G by Bi
.
∩ G. The set Bi
.
∩ G can be viewed as the set
of beliefs of player i in the restriction G. We call then the pair (B,
.
∩), where
B := (B1, . . .,Bn), a belief structure in the game H .
The following natural property of a belief structure (B,
.
∩) in H will be
relevant.
A If G1 ⊆G2 ⊆H , then for all i ∈ [1..n], Bi
.
∩ G1 ⊆ Bi
.
∩ G2.
This property simply states that for each player the set of his beliefs in a
restriction G1 of G2 is a subset of the set of his beliefs in G2.
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The following four belief structures were considered in the literature. Given
a finite non-empty set A we denote here by ∆A the set of probability distri-
butions over A and by ∆◦A the set of probability distributions over A that
assign a positive probability to each element of A.
(i) Bi := T−i for i ∈ [1..n].
So beliefs are joint pure strategies of the opponents (usually called point
beliefs). For a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H we define
Bi
.
∩ G := S−i.
We call then (B,
.
∩) the pure belief structure in H . This belief structure
was considered in Bernheim [1984].
A specific case with a different definition of
.
∩ was considered in Pearce
[1984]. In that paper H is a mixed extension of a finite game. So
given initial finite sets of strategies I1, . . ., In each set Ti equals ∆Ii, i.e.,
H := (∆I1, . . .,∆In, p1, . . ., pn). Then for a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn)
of H
Bi
.
∩ G := Πj 6=iSj,
where for a set Sj of mixed strategies of player j, Sj denotes its convex
hull.
(ii) Assume H is finite. Bi := Πj 6=i∆Tj for i ∈ [1..n].
So beliefs are joint mixed strategies of the opponents. For a restriction
G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H we define
Bi
.
∩ G := Πj 6=i∆Sj .
This belief structure was considered in Bernheim [1984].
(iii) Assume H is finite. Bi := ∆T−i for i ∈ [1..n].
So beliefs are probability distributions over the set of joint pure strategies
of the opponents (usually called correlated mixed strategies). For a
restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H we define
Bi
.
∩ G := ∆S−i.
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This belief structure was mentioned in Bernheim [1984] and studied in
Brandenburger and Dekel [1987], where the term correlated rational-
izability was introduced.
(iv) Assume H is finite. Bi := Πj 6=i∆◦Tj for i ∈ [1..n].
So beliefs are joint totally mixed strategies of the opponents. For a
restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H we define
Bi
.
∩ G := Πj 6=i∆
◦Sj .
This belief structure was studied in Pearce [1984], where a best response
to a belief formed by a joint totally mixed strategy of the opponents is
called a cautious response.
Given two finite sets A and B such that A⊆ B, we identify each proba-
bility distribution on A with the probability distribution on B in which 0 is
assigned to each element in B \ A. Then A⊆B implies ∆A⊆∆B. It is now
straightforward to see that property A is satisfied by the belief structures from
examples (i)—(iii). So by appropriately choosing the belief structure (B,
.
∩)
we shall be able to apply our results to a variety of frameworks including the
ones considered in Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984].
It is important, however, to note that property A is not satisfied by the
belief structure from example (iv). The reason is that for finite sets A and B
such that A⊆ B the inclusion ∆◦A⊆∆◦B does not hold. So the results of our
paper do not apply to the modifications of the notion of rationalizability that
rely on totally mixed strategies, for example Herings and Vannetelbosch [2000],
where the notion of weak perfect rationalizability is studied.1
3 Operators on complete lattices
We are interested in iterated reductions of strategic games entailed by various
ways of removing strategies. To deal with them in a uniform way we define the
relevant concepts for arbitrary operators on a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ )
with the largest element ⊤.
1This is not surprising since by the result of Pearce [1984] the notions of rationalizability
w.r.t. totally mixed strategies of the opponent and of not being weakly dominated by a
mixed strategy coincide in two-player finite games and, as is well-known, the latter notion
fails to be order independent.
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In what follows we use ordinals and denote them by α, β, γ. Given a,
possibly transfinite, sequence (Gα)α<γ of elements of D we denote their join
and meet respectively by
⋃
α<γ Gα and
⋂
α<γ Gα.
In the subsequent applications D will be the set of all restrictions of a fixed
strategic game H for n players, ordered by the componentwise set inclusion ⊆
(so H is the largest element) and
⋃
α<γ and
⋂
α<γ the customary set-theoretic
operations on them. But this additional information on the structure of D
will be irrelevant in the remainder of this section.
We now establish some general results on operators on complete lattices.
The proofs are straightforward and the results readily apply to the operators
we shall subsequently study.
Definition 1 Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e., T : D→D.
• We say that an element G is a fixpoint of T if T (G) = G.
• We call T monotonic if for all G1, G2
G1 ⊆G2 implies T (G1)⊆ T (G2).
• We call T contracting if for all G
T (G)⊆G.
• We define the contracting version of T by:
T (G) := T (G) ∩G.
• We define by transfinite induction a sequence of elements T α of D, where
α is an ordinal, as follows:
– T 0 := ⊤,
– T α+1 := T (T α),
– for all limit ordinals β, T β :=
⋂
α<β T
α.
• We call the least α such that T α+1 = T α the closure ordinal of T and
denote it by αT . We call then T
αT the outcome of (iterating) T . ✷
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The outcome of an operator can be the least element of the complete lattice.
So in the case of the complete lattice of the restrictions of H ordered by the
componentwise set inclusion ⊆ the outcome can be an empty restriction. In
general the closure ordinal of T , and hence its outcome, do not need to exist.
(Take for example an operator oscillating between two values.) However, we
have the following classic result due to Tarski [1955].2
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem Every monotonic operator on (D, ⊆ ) has a
largest fixpoint. This fixpoint is the outcome of T , i.e., it is of the form T αT .
Clearly, if T is monotonic, then so is T . Other observations concerning the
above notions are gathered in the following note.
Note 1 Consider an operator T on (D, ⊆ ).
(i) If T is contracting or monotonic, then T α+1 ⊆ T α for all α.
(ii) Suppose that T α+1 ⊆ T α for all α. Then
• T
α
= T α for all α,
• the outcomes of T and T exist and coincide.
Proof. The existence of the outcome of T under the assumption of (ii) follows
by the standard arguments of set theory (see, e.g., Aczel [1977]). The other
claims follow by transfinite induction. ✷
So if we are only interested in the operator iterations or its outcome, it does
not matter whether we choose an operator T that is contracting or monotonic,
or its contracting version T .
In what follows we shall frequently use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider two operators T and R on (D, ⊆ ) such that
• for all α, T (Rα)⊆R(Rα),
• T is monotonic.
Then for all α
T α ⊆ Rα.
In particular if R has an outcome, then T αT ⊆RαR .
2We use here its ‘dual’ version in which the iterations start at the largest and not at the
least element of a complete lattice.
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Proof. We prove the first claim by transfinite induction. By the definition
of the iterations we only need to consider the induction step for a successor
ordinal. So suppose the claim holds for some α. Then by the first two assump-
tions and the induction hypothesis we have the following string of inclusions
and equalities:
T α+1 = T (T α)⊆ T (Rα)⊆ R(Rα) = Rα+1.
By Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem T has an outcome, so the second claim
follows immediately from the first. ✷
We now formalize the idea that a procedure of iterated elimination of strate-
gies is order independent. Interestingly, it is possible to state this property
without specializing the underlying complete lattice to that of all restrictions
of the initial game, by simply focusing on iterations of operators. The defini-
tion we provide also takes care of the possibility that the elimination process
takes more than ω iteration steps.
Definition 2 Consider a contracting operator T (’T removes strategies’) on
(D, ⊆ ). We say that T is order independent if
RαR = T αT
(’the outcomes of the iterated eliminations of strategies coincide’) for each
operator R such that for all α
• T (Rα)⊆ R(Rα)⊆ Rα
(’R removes from Rα only strategies that T removes’)
• if T (Rα) ( Rα, then R(Rα) ( Rα
(’if T can remove some strategies from Rα, then R as well’).
(Note that RαR exists by Note 1.) ✷
The intuitions provided in the brackets hopefully make this definition self-
explanatory. This definition is perfectly satisfactory as long as we consider
procedures that remove strategies. However, we shall consider here arbitrary
procedures on games and sometimes they may add strategies. To deal with
this more general setting we introduce a definition of order independence for
arbitrary operators.
Definition 3 Consider an operator T on (D, ⊆ ).
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• We say that the operator R is a relaxation of T if for all α
– T (Rα)⊆R(Rα),
– if T (Rα)⊆ Rα, then R(Rα)⊆Rα,
– if Rα is a fixpoint of R, then it is a fixpoint of T .
• We say that T is order independent if the set
{G | G is an outcome of a relaxation of T}
has at most one element. ✷
The intuition behind the conditions defining a relaxation is as follows.
Suppose that T is a procedure on the set of restrictions of the initial game.
Then the first condition states that during the iterations of R (i.e., for all
restrictions Rα) the operator R ‘approximates’ T from above. In turn, the
second condition states that if T removes some strategies from some restriction
Rα, then so does R. Finally, the third condition states that if some strategy
can be removed from/added to some restriction Rα by the operator T (Rα
is not a fixpoint of T ), then the same holds for the R operator (Rα is not a
fixpoint of R).
Note that this definition of order independence of an operator T does not
even require that T has an outcome. If it does have, then each relaxation of
it has the same outcome as T , if it has one.
The following observation shows that the second definition generalizes the
first one.
Note 2 For a contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) both definitions of order
independence coincide.
Proof. For a contracting operator T the first two conditions of the definition of
a relaxation R are equivalent to the first condition on R in Definition 2, while
the third condition is equivalent to the second condition on R in Definition 2.
Moreover, for all relaxations R of T we have Rα+1 ⊆ Rα for all α and hence,
by Note 1, they all have an outcome. Also T is a relaxation of itself, so order
independence in the sense of Definition 3 is equivalent to the statement that
RαR = T αT holds for all relaxations R of T . ✷
From now on when referring to order independence we shall mean the latter
definition. The following general result holds.
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Theorem 1 (Order Independence) Every monotonic operator on (D, ⊆ )
is order independent.
Proof. Let T be a monotonic operator. By Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem T has
an outcome, T αT , which is the largest fixpoint of T . To prove the theorem it
suffices to show that
{G | G is an outcome of a relaxation of T} = {T αT }.
So take a relaxation R of T that has an outcome, RαR . By Lemma 1
T αT ⊆RαR . But by the definition of a relaxation RαR is a fixpoint of T and
T αT is the largest fixpoint of T , so also RαR ⊆ T αT . Consequently RαR = T αT .
✷
Intuitively, this result can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that an op-
erator T removes all strategies from a restriction of a game H that meet some
property and that we iterate this operator starting with H . Suppose now that
at each stage we remove only some strategies that meet this property (instead
of all). Then, when T is monotonic, we still end up with the same outcome
(which is the largest fixpoint of the T operator).
Note that we did not assume here that the operator T is contracting and
consequently had to rely on the second definition of order independence. Also,
in the proof we did not use the second condition of the definition of a relaxation.
In our approach this condition is needed only to deal with the contracting
operators that are not monotonic.
4 The GR and GR operators
We now apply the above considerations to specific operators. Each of them is
defined in the context of a fixed game H and a belief structure (B,
.
∩) in H .
Given a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H and a belief µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ G we say
that a strategy si of player i in the game H is a best response to µi in G,
and write si ∈ BRG(µi), if
∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, µi) ≥ pi(s
′
i, µi).
Note that si does not need to be an element of Si.
We now introduce the following operator GR (standing for ‘global ratio-
nalizability’) on the set of restrictions of H :
GR(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
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where for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ∃µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ G si ∈ BRH(µi)}.
So GR(G) is obtained by removing from H all strategies that are never
best responses in H (note this reference to H) to a belief held in G. That is,
when removing the strategies we allow justifications (for their removal) from
the initial game H .
Thanks to property A the operator GR is monotonic. So we can apply
to GR and its contracting version GR Note 1 and as a result we can confine
further analysis to the latter operator. The GR operator was considered in
Bernheim [1984] (called there λ, see page 1015).3 On the account of the results
from the previous section the GR operator enjoys various properties. We list
them as the following result.
Theorem 2 (GR)
(i) The largest fixpoint of GR exists and is its outcome.
(ii) GR is order independent.
(iii) For all relaxations R of GR and all α we have GR
α
⊆ Rα. ✷
In general, infinite iterations of GR can be necessary. In fact, in some
games ω iterations of GR are insufficient to reach the outcome, that is, the
closure ordinal of GR can be larger than ω.
Example 3 Consider the following game H with two players. The set of
strategies for each player is the set of natural numbers N augmented by −1.
The payoff functions are defined as follows. For k, ℓ ≥ 0 we put:
p1(k, ℓ) :=
{
ℓ+ 1 if k = ℓ+ 1
0 otherwise
p2(k, ℓ) :=
{
k if k = ℓ
0 otherwise
For the remaining pairs of strategies we put for k, ℓ ≥ −1 and k0, ℓ0 ≥ 0:
p1(−1, ℓ) := ℓ+ 1,
p1(k0,−1) := k0,
p2(k,−1) := k,
p2(−1, ℓ0) := ℓ0.
3The reader may now notice that in Example 1 we used the GR operator instead of GR,
which is more complicated to justify informally.
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Further we assume the pure belief structure, i.e., the beliefs are the strate-
gies of the opponent. The following two diagrams explain the structure of this
game. In each of them on the left we depict strategies of player 1 and on the
right the strategies of player 2. An arrow from a to b stands for the statement
‘strategy a is a best response to strategy b’. In particular, no arrow leaves
strategy 0 of player 1, which indicates that it is not a best response to any
strategy of player 2.
0
1
2
3
4
. . . . . .
4
3
2
1
0
. . .
4
3
2
1
0
. . .
4
3
2
1
−1 −1
0
Note that
• each −1 is a best response to any non-negative strategy,
• no best response to any −1 strategy exists,
• the best response to strategy k ≥ 0 of player 1 is k,
• the best response to strategy ℓ ≥ 0 of player 2 is ℓ+ 1.
Denote N ∪ {−1} by N ′. It is easy to see that
GR
0
= (N ′,N ′),
GR
1
= (N ′ \ {0},N ′),
GR
2
= (N ′ \ {0},N ′ \ {0}),
GR
3
= (N ′ \ {0, 1},N ′ \ {0}),
GR
4
= (N ′ \ {0, 1},N ′ \ {0, 1}),
. . .
So GR
ω
= ({−1}, {−1}). But in the initial game no −1 is a best response
to ‘the other’ −1. So GR(({−1}, {−1})) = (∅, ∅), that is GR
ω+1
= (∅, ∅). ✷
As already mentioned in Section 1, in Lipman [1994] a two-player game is
constructed for which ω iterations of GR are insufficient to reach the outcome.
In this example each set of beliefs Bi consists of the mixed strategies of the
opponent and the game is considerably more complex.
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5 The LR and LR operators
In this section we analyze the following operator LR (standing for ‘local ratio-
nalizability’) on the set of restrictions of H :
LR(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ∃µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ G si ∈ BRG(µi)}.
So LR(G) is obtained by removing from H all strategies that are never best
responses in G (so not in H) to a belief held in G. That is, when removing
strategies we use justifications (for their removal) from the currently considered
game G. For each restriction G of H , si ∈ BRH(µi) implies si ∈ BRG(µi), so
for all restrictions G we have GR(G)⊆ LR(G).
Unfortunately, the LR operator cannot be used as a meaningful basis for
the rationalizability notion.
Example 4 To see this reconsider the game from Example 3. We first prove
by induction that for n ≥ 0 we have LRn = GR
n
.
The base case obviously holds. Denote the set {0, . . ., m} by Im. For the
induction step note that if n = 2k, then
LR2k = GR
2k
= (N ′ \ Ik,N
′ \ Ik).
For any strategy m > k we have both
p1(m+ 1, m) = m+ 1 > 0 = p1(k + 1, m)
and
p1(m+ 1,−1) = m+ 1 > k + 1 = p1(k + 1,−1).
This shows that for each strategy ℓ ∈ N ′ \ Ik of player 2 the strategy k + 1 of
player 1 is not a best response to ℓ in LR2k and consequently
LR2k+1 = (N ′ \ Ik+1,N
′ \ Ik) = GR
2k+1
.
A similar argument applies when n = 2k + 1.
Consequently LRω = GRω = ({−1}, {−1}). But for all s1, s2 ∈ N ′ we have
p1(s1,−1) ≥ p1(−1,−1) = 0 and p2(−1, s2) ≥ p2(−1,−1) = −1. So for each
player each strategy from N ′ is a best response to the (unique) strategy −1 of
the other player in LRω. Hence LRω+1 = (N ′,N ′). This shows that LR has
no outcome. Also it is not monotonic and not even contracting. ✷
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Consequently, we confine our attention to its contracting version, the LR
operator (defined by LR(G) := LR(G)∩G), that always has an outcome. Note
for example that for the game from Example 3 we have LR
ω
= ({1}, {1}) =
LR
ω+1
, so ({−1}, {−1}) is the outcome of LR. This operator was introduced
implicitly and for specific games, in Pearce [1984], in Definition 1 on page
1032.
Unfortunately, LR fails to satisfy any of the properties of GR listed in
the GR Theorem 2. First, the largest fixpoint of LR does not need to exist.
Indeed, let us return to the game from Example 3. For all x ∈ N ∪ {−1}
the restriction ({x}, {x}) is a fixpoint of LR. However, their union, H , is not.
Consequently, by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem LR is not monotonic.
Next, we exhibit a relaxation R of LR the outcome of which is different
than the outcome of LR.
Example 5 Consider a two-player game H in which the set of strategies for
each player is the set N of natural numbers. The payoff to each player is
the number (strategy) he selected. Take as the set of mixed strategies the
probability distributions on N with a finite support (sometimes called simple
probabilities). So when computing the payoffs to mixed strategies each of
them can be written as
∑
i∈A π(i) · i, where A is a finite subset of N and π is
a probability distribution on A. (We shall return to this definition in Section
10.) Take the belief structure in which the beliefs of each player is the set of
so defined mixed strategies of the opponent.
Clearly, no strategy is a best response to a mixed strategy of the opponent.
So LR(H) = (∅, ∅) and (∅, ∅) is the outcome of LR. However, for any i ≥ 0
the restriction ({i}, {i}) is the outcome of a relaxation R of LR such that
R(H) = ({i}, {i}). ✷
This example shows that the rationalizability notion entailed by the LR
operator is not order independent. In this example the outcome of a relaxation
of LR is strictly larger than the outcome of LR. A more troublesome example
is the following one in which the outcome of a relaxation of LR is strictly
smaller than the outcome of LR.
Example 6 We return here to Example 1 from Section 1. SoH is a game with
two players, each with the set (0, 100] of strategies, and the payoff functions
are defined by:
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p1(s1, s2) :=


s1(100− s1) if s1 < s2
s1(100− s1)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s1 > s2
p2(s1, s2) :=


s2(100− s2) if s2 < s1
s2(100− s2)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s2 > s1
Also, we assume the pure belief structure.
We noted already in Example 1 that LR(H) = ({50}, {50}) and
LR(({50}, {50})) = (({50}, {50})).
Take now the relaxation R of LR defined by:
R(G) :=
{
((0, 50], (0, 50]) if G = H
LR(G) otherwise
Then R(H) = (0, 50], (0, 50]) and R(((0, 50], (0, 50])) = (∅, ∅) since
LR(((0, 50], (0, 50])) = (∅, ∅). This shows that H cannot be reduced to an
empty restriction by LR though it can by some relaxation of it.
Finally, note that in this example also the LR operator exhibits an erratic
behaviour. Indeed, LR(H) = ({50}, {50}), i.e., LR1 = ({50}, {50}). However,
it is easy to see that (49, 49) ∈ LR({50}, {50}), since p1(49, 50) > p1(50, 50)
and p2(50, 49) > p2(50, 50). So LR
2 is not a restriction of LR1. ✷
This example suggest that LR is unnecessarily weak. Also, it is counterin-
tuitive that when LR is used to define rationalizability, in some natural games
it is beneficial to eliminate at certain stages only some strategies that are never
best responses.
It is also easy to see that in Example 6 the outcome of the GR operator is
an empty restriction. Indeed, GR(H) = ({50}, {50}) and GR(({50}, {50})) =
(∅, ∅), since s1 = 49 is a better response in H to s2 = 50 than s1 = 50 and
symmetrically for the second player. So GR is strictly stronger than LR in the
sense that its outcome can be strictly smaller than that of LR.
In this example the outcome of GR is the same as the outcome of a relax-
ation of LR. However, this does not need to hold in general. In other words,
GR defines a genuinely more powerful rationalizability notion that cannot be
derived from LR.
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Indeed, reconsider the game from Example 3. It is easy to see that the finite
iterations of LR and GR coincide, so LR
ω
= ({−1}, {−1}). But ({−1}, {−1})
is a fixpoint of LR, so using LR we cannot reduce the initial game to an empty
restriction. Moreover, the same holds for any relaxation R of LR. Indeed, it is
easy to see that for each relaxation R of LR its outcome always contains the
joint strategy (−1,−1).
6 When the outcomes of GR and LR coincide
To analyze the situations when the iterations of the GR and LR operators
coincide we introduce the following property of the initial game H , given a
belief structure (B,
.
∩) in H .
B For all beliefs µi ∈ Bi a best response to µi in H exists.
The importance of this property stems from the fact that it allows us to
equate during each iteration of the LR operator the best responses in the
‘current’ game with the best responses in the initial game.
For the finite games and all belief structures property B obviously holds
but it can clearly fail for the infinite games. For instance, it does not hold
in the game considered in Example 5 since in this game no strategy is a best
response to a strategy of the opponent. Also it does not hold in the game from
Example 3 but we now offer an example of a game in which property B does
hold and in which the iterations of length > ω of both GR and LR are still
unavoidable.
Example 7 We modify the game from Example 3 by adding the third player
and by removing the strategy −1 from the set of strategies of each player.
So the set of strategies for each player is the set of natural numbers N . The
payoff functions are now defined as follows:
p1(k, ℓ,m) :=
{
ℓ+ 1 if k = ℓ+ 1
0 otherwise
p2(k, ℓ,m) :=
{
k if k = ℓ
0 otherwise
p3(k, ℓ,m) := 0.
Further we assume the pure belief structure. Note that
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• the best response to s−1 = (ℓ,m) is ℓ+ 1,
• the best response to s−2 = (k,m) is k,
• each m ∈ N is a best response to s−3 = (k, ℓ).
So to each joint strategy of the opponents a best response exists. That is,
property B is satisfied. Analogously to Example 3 we have:
GR
0
= (N ,N ,N ),
GR
1
= (N \ {0},N ,N ),
GR
2
= (N \ {0},N \ {0},N ),
GR
3
= (N \ {0, 1},N \ {0},N ),
GR
4
= (N \ {0, 1},N \ {0, 1},N ),
. . .
So GR
ω
= (∅, ∅,N ). Also GR((∅, ∅,N )) = (∅, ∅, ∅), so GR
ω+1
= (∅, ∅, ∅).
Finally, it is easy to see that LR
α
= GR
α
for all α (this is in fact, a
consequence of a result proved below), so ω + 1 is the closure ordinal of LR,
as well. ✷
For infinite games a natural situation when property B holds is the fol-
lowing. Recall that a game H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) is called compact if
the strategy sets are compact subsets of a complete metric space, and own-
uppersemicontinuous if each payoff function pi is uppersemicontinuous in
the ith argument. In turn, pi is called uppersemicontinuous in the ith
argument if the set {s′i ∈ Ti | pi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ r} is closed for all r ∈ R and all
s−i ∈ T−i.
As explained in Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] (see the proof of Lemma
on page 2012) for such games and pure belief structures property B holds by
virtue of a standard result from topology. If we impose a stronger condition
on the payoff functions, namely that each of them is continuous —the game
is called then continuous— then we are within the framework considered in
Bernheim [1984]. As shown there for compact and continuous games iterations
of length > ω for the GR operator do not need to be considered, that is, its
outcome (or equivalently the outcome of GR) can be reached in ω iterations.
To put it more succinctly: αGR ≤ ω.
In the presence of properties A and B still many differences between the
operatorsGR and LR remain. In particular, LR does not need to be monotonic
and its largest fixpoint does not need to exist. Indeed, consider the following
example in which we consider a finite game, which ensures property B.
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Example 8 Consider the game H := (A,A, p1, p2), where A = {1, . . ., n} and
for i, j ∈ A
p1(i, j) := i,
p2(i, j) := 1.
Assume the belief structure in which the beliefs of each player is the set of the
mixed strategies of the opponent, i.e., B1 = B2 = ∆A.
Note that
• n is the unique best response of player 1 to any belief µ1 ∈ B1 about
player 2,
• each j ∈ A is a best response of player 2 to any belief µ2 ∈ B2 about
player 1.
So LR(H) = ({n}, A) and ({n}, A) is a fixpoint of LR. Also each restriction
({j}, {j}) for j ∈ A is a fixpoint of LR. However, their union, H , is not.
Furthermore ({1}, {1})⊆H , but LR({1}, {1}) = ({1}, {1}) is not a re-
striction of LR(H) = ({n}, A), so LR is not monotonic. ✷
To prove the positive results we identify first the crucial property of the
initial game H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) that holds in the presence of property
B.
Lemma 2 Assume property B. Then for all relaxations R of LR and all i ∈
[1..n]
∀α ∀µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ Rα ∀si ∈ Ti (si ∈ BRRα(µi)→ si ∈ BRH(µi)),
where Rα := (S1, . . ., Sn).
In words, for all α and all beliefs in µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ Rα if si is a best response to
µi in R
α, then it is in fact a best response to µi in H .
Proof. Suppose si ∈ BRRα(µi), where µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ Rα. The operator LR is
contracting, so by the second condition in the definition of a relaxation for
all β ≤ α we have Rα ⊆ Rβ. Therefore by property A for all β ≤ α we have
µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ Rβ. In particular µi ∈ Bi.
By property B a best response s∗i to µi in H exists. But s
∗
i ∈ BRH(µi) im-
plies that for all β ≤ α, s∗i ∈ BRRβ (µi), so for all β ≤ α, s
∗
i ∈ LR(R
β)⊆Rβ+1
(the inclusion holds since R is a relaxation of LR). Moreover s∗i ∈ R
0 = H
and if s∗i ∈ R
β for all successor ordinals β ≤ α, then also s∗i ∈ R
β for all limit
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ordinals β ≤ α. So s∗i is a strategy of player i in all restrictions R
β for β ≤ α,
in particular Rα. Hence
pi(s
∗
i , µi) = pi(si, µi).
So si is also a best response to µi in H . ✷
We prove now the following positive results under the assumption of prop-
erty B. Part (i) shows that arbitrary iterations of the GR and LR operators
coincide. Part (ii) establishes order independence of the operator LR. This is
not an immediate consequence of part (i) since in general the relaxations of
GR and LR differ. Finally, in part (iii) we return to the LR operator that we
considered and rejected in the previous section.
Theorem 3 Assume properties A and B.
(i) For all α we have GR
α
= LR
α
. In particular GR
α
GR = LR
α
LR.
(ii) The LR operator is order independent.
(iii) For all α we have LRα = LR
α
. In particular LRαLR exists and LRαLR =
LR
α
LR.
Proof.
(i) For all G we have GR(G)⊆ LR(G), so in view of Lemma 1 we only need to
prove for all α the inclusion LR
α
⊆GR
α
. We proceed by transfinite induction.
Suppose that LR
α
⊆GR
α
.
Let si be a strategy of player i in LR
α+1
. By definition for some µi ∈
Bi
.
∩ LR
α
we have si ∈ BRLRα(µi), so by Lemma 2 si ∈ BRH(µi). Further,
LR
α+1
⊆ LR
α
, so by the induction hypothesis si is a strategy of player i in
GR
α
. So si is a strategy of player i in GR
α+1
.
The induction step for a limit ordinal is immediate.
(ii) Consider a relaxation R of LR that has an outcome. RαR is a fixpoint of
R, so RαR is also a fixpoint of LR. Let si be a strategy of player i in R
αR .
By the definition of LR for some µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ RαR we have si ∈ BRRαR (µi), so
by Lemma 2 si ∈ BRH(µi). Since si was arbitrary, this proves that RαR is a
fixpoint of GR. Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem RαR ⊆GR
α
GR .
Moreover, by Lemma 1 GR
α
GR ⊆ RαR. Consequently RαR = GR
α
GR .
(iii) We proceed by transfinite induction. Suppose the claim holds for all
β ≤ α. To prove it for α + 1 we first we prove that LRα+1 ⊆ LRα. Let si
24
be a strategy of player i in LRα+1. Then for some µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ LRα we have
si ∈ BRLRα(µi). By the induction hypothesis LR
α = LR
α
, so by Lemma 2
si ∈ BRH(µi).
Further, since LR is contracting, by property A for all β ≤ α we have
µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ LR
β
and hence by the induction hypothesis for all β ≤ α we have
µi ∈ Bi
.
∩ LRβ. So si is a strategy of player i in all restrictions LR
β for β ≤ α,
in particular LRα. Since si was arbitrary, this proves that LR
α+1 ⊆ LRα.
Hence
LRα+1 = LRα+1 ∩ LRα = LR(LRα) = LR
α+1
,
where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis.
The induction step for a limit ordinal is immediate. ✷
We mentioned already that property B is satisfied by the compact and
continuous games and pure belief structures. So part (i) is closely related to
the result of Ambroszkiewicz [1994] who showed that for such games the finite
iterations of his versions of GR and LR operators coincide for the limited case
of two-player games and pure belief structures. In his definition both operators
are defined by considering the reduction for each player in succession and not
in parallel.
In summary, by virtue of the results established in the last three sections,
in the presence of property B, rationalizability can be equivalently defined
using any of the introduced four operators GR, GR,LR and LR. However,
when property B does not hold, only the first two operators are of interest.
7 Strict dominance: the GS and GS operators
Recall that one of the consequences of the assumption that all players are ra-
tional is that none of them could possibly use any strictly dominated strategy.
In this and the next section we apply our general approach to operators on
games to establish analogous results for the notion strict dominance.4 In what
follows we analyze four operators that can be naturally used to define iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Given a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) and two
strategies si, s
′
i from Ti we write s
′
i ≻G si as an abbreviation for the statement
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i) and say then that s
′
i strictly dominates
si on G or, equivalently, that si is strictly dominated on G by s
′
i.
4As is well-known there is an intimate connection between the notions of rationalizability
and strict dominance. This, however, has no bearing on our results. We shall discuss this
matter in Section 10.
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First, we introduce the following operator GS (standing for ‘global strict
dominance’) on the set of restrictions of H :
GS(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻G si}.
So GS(G) is obtained by removing from H all strategies that are strictly
dominated on G by some strategy in H and not in G. The reasoning embodied
in the definition of this operator is analogous to the one used for GR: we
remove a strategy from H if a ‘better’ (here: strictly dominating) strategy
exists in the initial game H , even if in the iteration process leading from H to
G this better strategy might have been removed.
The GS operator was introduced in Milgrom and Roberts [1990], where
only its iterations up to ω were considered. As noted there this operator is
clearly monotonic. So Note 1 applies and we can confine our considerations to
the GS operator (defined by GS(G) := GS(G)∩G) that is also monotonic.5 On
the account of the results of Section 3 this operator enjoys the same properties
as the GR operator. We summarize them in the theorem below.
Theorem 4 (GS)
(i) The largest fixpoint of GS exists and is its outcome.
(ii) GS is order independent.
(iii) For all relaxations R of GS and all α we have GS
α
⊆ Rα. ✷
The GS operator was introduced and analyzed in Chen, Long and Luo
[2005], where the need for transfinite iterations was explained and where prop-
erties (i) and (ii) were proved.
8 Strict dominance: the LS and LS operators
The customary definition of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies (IESDS) involves elimination of strategies that are strictly domi-
nated by a strategy from the currently considered game and not the initial
5The reader may now notice that in Example 2 we used the GS operator instead of GS,
which is more complicated to justify informally.
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game H . A natural operator that formalizes this idea is the following one (LS
stands for ‘local strict dominance’):
LS(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
where G := (S1, . . ., Sn) and for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Si s
′
i ≻G si}.
So here, in contrast to GS, a strategy is removed if it is strictly dominated
on G by some strategy in G itself. However, the LS operator is not acceptable
for the same reason as the previously considered LR operator.
Example 9 Reconsider the two-player game H from Example 5 in which the
set of strategies for each player is the set of natural numbers. The payoff to
each player is the number he selected. In this game each strategy is strictly
dominated.
So LS(H) = (∅, ∅). But LS((∅, ∅)) = H , since the condition ¬∃s′i ∈ Sis
′
i ≻G
si is vacuously satisfied when Si = ∅. So the iterations of LS oscillate between
H and (∅, ∅). Hence the outcome of LS does not exist.
A fortiori LS is not monotonic and not contracting. The most problematic
is of course that this operator yields a non-empty restriction (in fact, the initial
game) when applied to an empty restriction. ✷
So, as in the case of the LR operator, we confine our attention to the
contracting version LS (defined by LS(G) := LS(G) ∩ G). In fact, in the
literature the LS operator was not considered but rather LS. However, LS
fails to be monotonic, even for finite games. Indeed, the game from Example
8 provides the evidence.
The LS operator was shown to be order independent for finite games in
Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990]. It was studied for infinite games in Dufwen-
berg and Stegeman [2002] where it was noted that it fails to be order inde-
pendent for arbitrary games. This is immediate to see using the game from
Examples 5 and 9. Indeed, the outcome of LS is then (∅, ∅), whereas for any
i ≥ 0 the restriction ({i}, {i}) is the outcome of a relaxation R of LS such that
R(H) = ({i}, {i}).
In the remainder of this section we prove a limited form of order indepen-
dence of LS. Then, in the next section, we compare our results with those
of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002]. First, following Dufwenberg and Stege-
man [2002], we consider the following property of the initial game H :
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P For all relaxations R of LS and all k ≥ 0, every strictly dominated strategy
in Rk has an undominated (‘best’) dominator.
This property limited to the initial game (so for k = 0) was considered in
Milgrom and Roberts [1996]. We generalize this property to all ordinals and
formalize it as follows:
C(α) For all relaxations R of LS and all i ∈ [1..n]
∀si ∈ Ti (∃s′i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rα si→
∃s∗i ∈ Ti (s
∗
i ≻Rα si ∧ ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rα s
∗
i )).
Note that all the quantifiers range over Ti and not Si. So we refer to
strict dominance by a strategy in the initial game H and not in the currently
considered reduction Rα. In what follows we shall rather use the following
simpler property:
D(α) For all relaxations R of LS and all i ∈ [1..n]
∀si ∈ Ti((∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rα si)→∃s
∗
i ∈ Si s
∗
i ≻Rα si),
where Rα := (S1, . . ., Sn).
It states that each si strictly dominated in R
α is in fact strictly dominated
in Rα by some strategy in Rα.
First we establish a lemma that clarifies the relation between these two
properties.
Lemma 3 For each α, C(α) implies D(α).
Proof. Consider a relaxation R of LS, some i ∈ [1..n]. Let Rα := (S1, . . ., Sn).
Suppose si ∈ Ti and s′i ∈ Ti are such that s
′
i ≻Rα si. By property C(α)
∃s∗i ∈ Ti (s
∗
i ≻Rα si ∧ ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rα s
∗
i ).
LS is contracting so for β ≤ α we have Rα ⊆ Rβ and consequently ∀β ≤
α ¬∃s′i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rβ s
∗
i . Hence s
∗
i is a strategy of player i in all restrictions R
β
for β ≤ α. In particular s∗i ∈ Si. ✷
Consequently all the results that follow also hold when property C(α) is
used instead of D(α).
We now establish a number of consequences of property D(α) for various
values of α. Part (i) is a counterpart of Theorem 3(i). Part (ii) is a limited
order independence result for the LS operator. Finally, in part (iii) we compare
the operators LS and LS and establish an analogue of Theorem 3(iii).
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Theorem 5
(i) Assume property ∀β < αD(β) for an ordinal α. Then GS
α
= LS
α
. In
particular, if ∀αD(α), then GS
α
GS = LS
α
LS.
(ii) Assume property ∀αD(α). Then the LS operator is order independent.
(iii) Assume property ∀β < α + 1D(β). Then LSα = LS
α
. In particular, if
∀αD(α), then LSαLS exists and LSαLS = LS
α
LS.
Proof.
(i) In view of Lemma 1 we only need to prove the inclusion LS
α
⊆GS
α
and
only the induction step for a successor ordinal requires a justification. So
suppose that ∀β < α + 1D(β). Let LS
α
:= (S1, . . ., Sn).
Let si be a strategy of player i in LS
α+1
. By definition si ∈ Si and ¬∃s′i ∈
Si s
′
i ≻LSα si, so by the assumed property ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻LSα si. Hence
¬∃s′i ∈ Tis
′
i ≻GSα si, since by the induction hypothesis LS
α
⊆GS
α
. Also,
because of the same inclusion, si is a strategy of player i in GS
α
. So si is a
strategy of player i in GS
α+1
.
(ii) The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3(ii). Consider a relaxation R of
LS that has an outcome. RαR is a fixpoint of R, so RαR is also a fixpoint of
LS.
Suppose now RαR := (S1, . . ., Sn) and take some si ∈ Si. By the definition
of LS we have ¬∃s∗i ∈ Si s
∗
i ≻RαR si, so by property D(αR) we get ¬∃s
′
i ∈
Ti s
′
i ≻RαR si. Since si was arbitrary, this proves that R
αR is a fixpoint of GS.
Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem RαR ⊆ GS
α
GS .
Moreover, for all G we have both GS(G)⊆ LS(G) and LS(G)⊆ R(G), so
by Lemma 1 GS
α
GS ⊆RαR and consequently RαR = GS
α
GS .
(iii) We prove the claim by transfinite induction. Assume it holds for all
β ≤ α. We prove it for α + 1. So suppose that ∀β < α + 2 D(β). Let
LSα := (S1, . . ., Sn). Let si be a strategy of player i in LS
α+1. By definition
¬∃s′i ∈ Si s
′
i ≻LSα si.
By the induction hypothesis LSα = LS
α
, so by the assumed property
¬∃s′i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻LSα si. So si is a strategy of player i in GS(LS
α
). But by part
(i) LS
α
= GS
α
and LS
α+1
= GS
α+1
. Also, since GS is monotonic, by Note 1
GS
α
= GSα and GS
α+1
= GSα+1. So
GS(LS
α
) = GS(GS
α
) = GSα+1 = LS
α+1
.
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Since si was arbitrary, this shows that LS
α+1 ⊆ LS
α+1
. But also
LS
α+1
= LS(LSα) = LSα+1 ∩ LSα ⊆ LSα+1,
where the first equality holds by the induction hypothesis. So LS
α+1
= LSα+1.
The induction step for a limit ordinal is immediate. ✷
Property ∀αC(α) obviously holds when the initial game is finite and implies
by Lemma 3 property ∀αD(α), so part (ii) generalizes the already mentioned
result of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990]. Further, note that in the proof of
part (i) we actually use a weaker property than ∀β < αD(β). Indeed, we use
it only with R equal to LS, so it suffices to assume that for all β < α
∀si ∈ Ti((∃s
′
i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻LSβ si)→∃s
∗
i ∈ Si s
∗
i ≻LSβ si),
where LS
β
:= (S1, . . ., Sn).
In summary, the iterations of two operators, GS and GS, always coincide
and each of them is order independent. Further, when ∀αD(α) holds, all
iterations of all four operators, GS,GS,LS and LS, coincide and any of them
can be used to define the outcome of IESDS. The property ∀αD(α) holds
when the initial game is finite, so to conclude this section let us summarize
the consequences of the above result for this case.
Corollary 1 Suppose the initial game H is finite. Then
(i) for all k ≥ 0 the iterations of all four operators coincide, i.e.,
GSk = GS
k
= LS
k
= LSk,
(ii) the outcomes of these four operators exist and coincide,
(iii) the operators GS, GS and LS are order independent. ✷
9 Comparison with the results of Dufwenberg
and Stegeman
We now compare the results of the previous section with those of Dufwenberg
and Stegeman [2002]. First, we introduce the following notion. We say that
30
G is an ω-outcome of an operator T on the set of restrictions of H if G is an
outcome of T and αT ≤ ω.6
That is, G is an ω-outcome of T if G = T ω and T ω+1 = T ω. For a
contracting operator, in contrast to the outcome, an ω-outcome does not need
to exist. The study of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] focuses on the set
ω(LS) := {G | G is an ω-outcome of a relaxation of LS}.
If this set has at most one element, then they view LS as order independent.
In what follows we refer then to DS-order independence. Recall that
according to our definition an operator T is order independent if the set
{G | G is an outcome of a relaxation of T}
has at most one element. We can then state the main results of Dufwenberg
and Stegeman [2002] as follows. To clarify part (i) recall that by definition a
restriction (S1, . . ., Sn) is a game if each Si is non-empty.
Theorem 6
(i) If H is compact and own-uppersemicontinuous and the set ω(LS) has an
element which is a game, then this is its only element.
(ii) If H is compact and continuous, then the set ω(LS) has precisely one
element and this element is a compact and continuous game. ✷
Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] considered property P from the previous
section but formalized it as ∀k < ωE(k), where for an ordinal α we have:
E(α) For all relaxations R of LS and all i ∈ [1..n]
∀si ∈ Si (∃s
′
i ∈ Si s
′
i ≻Rα si→
∃s∗i ∈ Si (s
∗
i ≻Rα si ∧ ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Si s
′
i ≻Rα s
∗
i )),
where Rα := (S1, . . ., Sn).
They showed that property ∀k < ωE(k) is satisfied by the compact and
own-uppersemicontinuous games but is not a sufficient condition for DS-order
independence of LS. Note that the difference between the properties C(α) and
E(α) is that in the former all the quantifiers range over Ti and not Si. So in
6In Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] an ω-outcome is called a maximal (→∗)-
reduction .
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C(α) we refer to strict dominance by a strategy in the initial game H , while in
E(α) to strict dominance by a strategy in the currently considered reduction
Rα.
The following result then relates property D(α) (and hence by Lemma 3
property C(α)) to DS-order independence of LS.
Theorem 7 Assume property D(ω). Then ω(LS)⊆ {LS
ω
}, so LS is DS-order
independent.
Proof. Let R be a relaxation of LS such that αR ≤ ω. For all α we have both
GS(Rα)⊆ LS(Rα) and LS(Rα)⊆ R(Rα), so by Lemma 1
GS
ω
⊆ Rω. (1)
Let Rω := (S1, . . ., Sn). Take a strategy si ∈ Si. Rω is a fixpoint of R,
so it is a fixpoint of LS. Hence ¬∃s′i ∈ Si s
′
i ≻Rω si, so by property D(ω)
¬∃s′i ∈ Ti s
′
i ≻Rω si. Since si was arbitrary, this shows that R
ω is a fixpoint of
GS. So by the GS Theorem 4(i) we have Rω ⊆GS
α
GS . Also, GS is contracting,
so GS
α
GS ⊆GS
ω
and hence
Rω ⊆GS
ω
.
This inclusion combined with (1) yields Rω = GS
ω
. By Theorem 5(i) Rω =
LS
ω
.
So we showed that any ω-outcome of a relaxation of LS equals LS
ω
. This
concludes the proof. ✷
Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] also showed that for compact and own-
uppersemicontinuous games property ∀k ≤ ωD(k) holds. So the above theo-
rem is a minor improvement of the result of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002]
listed earlier as Theorem 6(i). Finally, note that when ∀k ≤ ωD(k) holds,
then by Theorem 5(i) and (iii) the first ω iterations of all four operators,
GS,GS,LS and LS, coincide. So in particular this is the case for the compact
and own-uppersemicontinuous games.
10 Strict dominance by a mixed strategy
It is well-known that the notions of strict dominance and best responses, and
consequently the notions of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies and of rationalizability, are closely related. In this context one usually
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considers strict dominance by a mixed strategy. In section we review this re-
lationship and clarify to what extent the results of the previous three sections
can be extended to mixed strategies.
In Moulin [1984] the class of so-called nice games is introduced for which
the notions of a best response to a point belief (i.e., a joint pure strategy
of the opponents) and of not being weakly dominated by a pure strategy
coincide. These are games (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) in which each strategy set Ti
is a compact and convex subset of R and each payoff function pi is continuous
and strictly quasiconcave w.r.t. Ti, where the latter means that for all
α ∈ (0, 1) and si, s′i ∈ Ti with si 6= s
′
i and all s−i ∈ T−i
pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s′i, s−i) implies pi(αsi + (1− α)s
′
i, s−i) > pi(s
′
i, s−i).
In Zimper [2006] it is clarified that for nice games the notions of weak dom-
inance and strict dominance coincide. This yields for nice games equivalence
between the notions of a best response and of not being strictly dominated,
both w.r.t. pure strategies. This result is then generalized by assuming in-
stead of strict quasiconcativity that each payoff function pi is quasiconcave
w.r.t. Ti, which means that for all α ∈ (0, 1) and si, s′i ∈ Ti with si 6= s
′
i and
all s−i ∈ T−i
pi(si, s−i) > pi(s
′
i, s−i) implies pi(αsi + (1− α)s
′
i, s−i) > pi(s
′
i, s−i)
and
pi(si, s−i) = pi(s
′
i, s−i) implies pi(αsi + (1− α)s
′
i, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
It is also shown that the equivalence does not need to hold anymore if the
strategy sets Ti are subsets of R2 instead of R.
In the case of finite games the notion of strict dominance extends in the
obvious to the case of mixed strategies. By the result of Pearce [1984] in two-
player finite games the notions of a best response to a mixed strategy of the
opponent and of not being strictly dominated by a mixed strategy coincide.
In Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] this result is presented as a result for n-
players finite games where the best response is defined w.r.t. correlated mixed
strategies. More recently, in Zimper [2005], both results were generalized to
compact games with bounded and continuous payoff functions.
In an arbitrary game (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) the set of mixed strategies ∆Ti
of player i is defined as the set of all probability measures on a given σ-algebra
of subsets of Ti. In the case of compact games with continuous payoff functions
it is customary (as in Zimper [2005]) to take the σ-algebra of Borel sets. The
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payoff functions are then extended from pure to mixed strategies in a standard
way using integration. To ensure that the payoffs remain finite the original
payoff functions are assumed to be bounded.
If the payoff functions are unbounded, an alternative (used in Example 5)
is to define mixed strategies as the probability measures with a finite support.
More general approaches for two-player games are studied in Tijs [1975].
In what follows we just assume that given the initial game (T1, . . ., Tn,
p1, . . ., pn) for each i ∈ [1..n] a set ∆Ti ⊇ Ti of mixed strategies of player i is
given and that each payoff function pi is extended to pi : ∆T1×. . .×∆Tn →R.
If the initial game is finite, we take the usual set of mixed strategies and the
customary extension of each payoff function.
Then the results of Section 8 can be directly adapted to the case of strict
dominance by a mixed strategy as follows. First, we introduce the counterpart
of the LS operator defined by:
MLS(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
where G := (S1, . . ., Sn) and for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ¬∃mi ∈ ∆Si mi ≻G si},
where we use the extension of the ≻G relation to the pairs of mixed and pure
strategies.
In the literature, in the case of finite games, the iterated elimination of
strategies that are strictly dominated by a mixed strategy is defined as the
iteration of MLS, the contracting version of the above operator. The obvious
modification of the GS operator to the mixed strategies is defined by:
MGS(G) := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n),
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
S ′i := {si ∈ Ti | ¬∃mi ∈ ∆Ti mi ≻G si}.
Just as GS, the MGS operator is clearly monotonic. Its contracting ver-
sion, MGS, is studied in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006] (it is
their map Φ), where its relation to the concept of best response sets is clarified.
Next, we modify the property D(α) to the case of mixed strategies:
MD(α) For all relaxations R of MLS and all i ∈ [1..n]
∀si ∈ Ti((∃mi ∈ ∆Ti mi ≻Rα si)→∃m
∗
i ∈ ∆Si m
∗
i ≻Rα si),
where Rα := (S1, . . ., Sn).
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Then we have the following direct counterpart of Theorem 5.
Theorem 8
(i) Assume property ∀β < αMD(β) for an ordinal α. Then MGS
α
= MLS
α
.
In particular, if ∀αMD(α), then MGS
α
MGS = MLS
α
MLS.
(ii) Assume property ∀αMD(α). Then the MLS operator is order indepen-
dent.
(iii) Assume property ∀β < α + 1MD(β). Then MLSα = MLS
α
. In partic-
ular, if ∀αMD(α), then MLSαMLS exists and MLSαMLS = MLS
α
MLS.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 5 and omitted. ✷
Consequently, when ∀αMD(α) all iterations of all four operators, MGS,
MGS,MLS and MLS, coincide. To establish this result, as in the case of strict
dominance by a pure strategy, it is sufficient to use property MD(α) with R
equal to MLS.
The question remains for which games property MD(α) holds. We found
(the details are relegated to another paper) that in the case of finite games
and the customary set of mixed strategies, property MD(k) holds for all k ≥
0. Since the closure ordinals of the above four operators are then finite, we
conclude by the above theorem that all iterations of the above four operators
then coincide.
11 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed two widely used ways of reducing strategic games
concerned with the concepts of rationalizability and iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. We showed that both concepts can be defined in
a number of ways that differ for arbitrary infinite games. Also, we clarified for
which games these differences disappear. Our analysis was based on a general
study of operators on complete lattices and showed that concepts defined by
means of monotonic operators are easier to assess and study.
In some circumstances a reduction notion defined using a non-monotonic
operator still can be analyzed using our approach, by relating the operator to a
monotonic one. This is for example how we established the order independence
of the LS operator under the assumption ∀αD(α) —by relating it to the GS
operator which is monotonic.
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An important aspect of our analysis is that we allow transfinite iterations
of the corresponding operators. Their use in an analysis of reasoning used
by rational agents can be baffling. These matters were originally discussed
in Lipman [1991], where a need for transfinite iterations in the definition of
rationalizability was noted. The distinction between finitary and infinitistic
forms of reasoning is well understood in mathematical logic. Both forms have
been widely used and we see no reason for limiting the study of games to
finitary methods.
The final matter that merits attention is the striking difference between the
way rationalizability and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
(IESDS) have been traditionally defined and used in the literature. Both
concepts are supposed to capture reasoning used by rational players. Yet,
in the definition of the former concept, according to Bernheim [1984], the
reference point for a deletion of a strategy is the initial game, while in the
definition of the latter one the currently considered game. This difference is
important, since the first approach yields a monotonic operator, while the
second one not.
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